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Abstract—A battery charging policy that provides privacy
guarantees for smart meter systems with finite capacity battery
is proposed. For this policy an upper bound on the information
leakage rate is provided. The upper bound applies for general
random processes modelling the energy consumption of the user.
It is shown that the average energy consumption of the user
determines the information leakage rate to the utility provider.
The upper bound is shown to be tight by deriving the probability
law of a random process achieving the bound.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing appeal for economical and environmentally-
friendly energy calls for more efficient energy generation,
distribution, and consumption [1]. The introduction of a digital
infrastructure into the traditional power system takes steps
towards this vision by providing a cyber layer that elevates
the existing power system to a cyberphysical system. This
advanced sensing and communication infrastructure envisioned
by the smart grid enables high resolution and real time man-
agement of the processes within the grid. This application layer
also enables dynamic energy pricing, shifting user demand to
match energy generation [2]. Moreover, the introduction of
energy consumption indicators through Smart Meters (SMs)
are reported to reduce the energy consumption of the user by
up to 15% by raising awareness of the energy cost [3].
While the high-resolution information provided by the
smart grid brings clear advantages it also raises privacy and
security concerns [4], [5], [6]. By analysing the consumption
profile of a user, techniques such as non-intrusive load moni-
toring (NILM) [7] track and recognise appliance usage patterns
[8], [9]. Human presence, usage of individual appliances [10],
[11], and even tuned TV channel [12] are among the list of
recognizable elements [13]. This privacy breach hinders the
implementation of some of the essential components of the
smart grid [4], [5]. Within this paradigm, SMs are central
components to the dilemma posed by the need for accurate
monitoring while providing privacy. In 2009 two bills law
aimed to enforce the usage of SMs were blocked by the Senate
of the Netherlands motivated by the privacy concerns that
emerge as a result of the increased penetration of SMs [14].
There is a growing body of literature addressing the conflict
between efficient energy monitoring and privacy brought forth
by the introduction of SMs. In [15], [16] obfuscation of the
knowledge that the utility provider (UP) has about the energy
consumption of the user is studied. Indeed, in the case in which
the SM readings are the only source of information available to
the UP, obfuscation yields some degree of privacy. Obfuscation
is achieved by several mechanisms, such as aggregating the
consumption of multiple users [15], compression of the energy
consumption sequences [16] or homomorphic encryption [17]
among others. A different approach to the problem arises in
the setting in which users have access to alternative energy
sources or energy storage devices [18]. In this case, the UP
has perfect knowledge of the energy provided to the user, but
the user employs the energy storing capability of the system
to dissociate the energy consumed by the appliances from
the energy provided by the UP. In [19], [20], [21] the case
in which the user is assumed to have an alternative energy
source with instantaneous power constraints is studied. In
[20], [22], [23], [24] the user is assumed to have access to a
rechargeable battery and the energy consumption is modelled
as an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
process.
In a practical setting, the energy consumption profiles
of users exhibit non-stationary statistical structures and are
not well described by memoryless random processes [23].
Moreover, information-theoretic privacy measures for random
processes that are not i.i.d. are still not well understood [25].
The privacy utility tradeoff is characterized for stationary
Gaussian energy consumption models in [26]. A first-order
time-homogeneous Markov chain is considered in [27]. In this
work we adopt a non-probabilistic framework by modelling
the energy management system (EMS) with a finite capacity
battery as a finite state channel without probabilistic structure.
Inspired by the code construction in [28] we propose an energy
charging policy and we characterize the privacy guarantees of
the strategy for general random processes. We also particu-
larize the analysis to the case in which the average energy
consumption of the user is known. For this case we provide an
upper bound to the amount of information that the user leaks to
the UP and show that the average energy consumption governs
the privacy that is achievable by the user. In this paper vectors
are denoted by bold font, e.g. x, random variables are denoted
by upper-case, e.g. X , and vectors of n random variables are
denoted by super-indexing the size, e.g. Xn.
II. BATTERY SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the energy management system (EMS) oper-
ating in discrete-time illustrated in Fig. 1. The energy con-
sumption of the user is modelled as a discrete-time random
process X1, X2, . . . where Xi is a random variable taking
values in X = {0, 1, . . . , α}. In this setting Xi describes the
energy consumed at time instant i ∈ N. At each time instant,
the energy consumption of the user is satisfied by requesting
energy from the UP or by discharging the battery. This decision
is taken by the energy management unit (EMU) at each time
instant based on some power consumption performance and
privacy criteria. The energy requested from the UP is also a
discrete-time random process Y1, Y2, ... where Yi is a random
variable taking values in Y = {0, 1, ..., γ} and describing
the energy requested from the UP at time instant i ∈ N.
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Fig. 1. Diagram of an Energy Management System with finite battery.
When Yi > Xi, the excess energy is stored in the battery.
Alternatively, when Yi ≤ Xi, the energy deficit is obtained
from the battery. We assume the UP is able to satisfy the
energy consumption of the user even in the case when there
is no battery, i.e. γ ≥ α.
In the above model, the state Si taking values in S =
{0, 1, ..., β} describes the energy stored in the battery at time
i. The energy stored in the battery Si is a function of the
previous energy consumption Xi, the energy request Y i, and
the initial state s0 ∈ S given by
Si = s0 +
i−1∑
k=0
(Yk −Xk) . (1)
Within this setting, a power outage occurs when Si +
Yi −Xi < 0, and energy is wasted when Si + Yi −Xi > β.
In the following we focus on EMUs that do not allow power
outages nor energy wasting but provide a quantifiable privacy
guarantee for the user. Given a particular realization x ∈ X n
of the random process X1, X2, . . . , Xn modelling the energy
consumption of the user up to time n, the set of energy
requests that the EMU can implement is limited by the
power outage and the energy waste constraints. The following
definition describes the set of energy requests that the EMU
can implement.
Definition 1: Given an energy consumption sequence x ∈
X n as the input of an EMU with a battery of capacity β,
the set of stable energy request sequences that avoid power
outages and energy waste is given by
Ynβ (s0,x) := {y ∈ Yn : si + yi − xi ∈ S for all i}, (2)
where si ∈ Si is the state of the battery at time i, determined
by x and y according to (1).
The task of the EMU is therefore to choose a particular
sequence in the Ynβ (s0,x) for a given power consumption
realization x. The structure of the particular choice determines
the policy implemented by the EMU and is captured by the
following definition.
Definition 2: Given an EMU with a battery of capacity β
the set of stable battery policies is the set of mappings between
the energy consumption sequences and the set of stable energy
request sequences given by
Pβ := {Pβ : S × X n → Ynβ (s0,x)}. (3)
Fig. 2. [29] Diagram depicting the operation of a trapdoor channel with β = 1.
Since Y n is known by the UP, the information about the energy
consumption of the user that the UP acquires via the energy
request is given by the mutual information I(Xn;Y n). As in
[22] this motivates the following definition of privacy.
Definition 3: Given an EMU operating with the stable
battery policy Pβ , the information about the consumption of
the user, Xn, that is leaked to the UP is the information
leakage rate given by
Lβ (X
n, Pβ) :=
1
n
I(Xn;Y n). (4)
In a SM privacy context, the aim of the EMU is to choose
a stable battery policy Pβ that minimizes the information
leakage rate, i.e. maximizes the privacy of the user. Note
that the information leakage depends on the joint probability
distribution of Xn and Y n. In general, the evaluation of (4)
yields involved expressions that are difficult to evaluate [25].
For that reason previous results [19], [20], [22] tend to consider
simple probabilistic models, e.g. memoryless processes, to
evaluate the mutual information. In the remaining of the paper
we analyze the privacy guarantees for general discrete-time
random processes modelling the user consumption. To that
end, we model the EMS with a battery of capacity β as a non-
probabilistic finite-state channel [28]. The rationale for this
approach and the equivalence between the EMS and a non-
probabilistic channel are discussed in the following section.
A. Equivalence with the trapdoor channel
The trapdoor channel [28], [29] is defined as a box
containing b0 blue balls and β − b0 red balls. The operation
of the channel is depicted in Fig. 2. At time i a new ball Xi
coloured blue or red is thrown into the box. Immediately after,
one of the β+1 balls inside the box is selected and taken out
of the box. Let Yi denote the ball extracted at time i. Following
this model, the number of blue balls inside the box at time i
is given by
bi = b0 +
i−1∑
k=0
bl (Xk)−
i−1∑
k=0
bl (Yk) , (5)
where the indicator function bl(·) equals 1 when its argument
is coloured blue and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the number of red
balls inside the box at time i is given by ri = β−bi. Replacing
bi = β − ri and b0 = β − r0 into (5) yields:
ri = r0 +
i−1∑
k=0
(
bl (Yk)− bl (Xk)
)
. (6)
The number of red balls inside the box is bounded between 0
and β. For a box of capacity β the set of stable output balls
Ynβ (r0,x) is defined as the set of outputs yn ∈ Yn than can
be pulled out of the box given an initial state r0 and an input
sequence x ∈ X n, i.e.
Ynβ (r0,x) = {y : ri + bl (yi)− bl (xi) ∈ R for all i}, (7)
where R = {0, ..., β}.
It is easy to see that for the case in which γ = α = 1
the EMS with a battery of capacity β described in Section II
is equivalent to the trapdoor channel of capacity β. The set
of balls inside the box determines the state of the trapdoor
channel, and similarly, the amount of energy stored in the
battery determines the state of the EMS channel. For the
case in which α = γ = 1 both systems are equivalent since
requesting energy from the grid corresponds to extracting a ball
from the trapdoor channel. Similarly, replacing a ball from the
trapdoor channel in (6) corresponds to charging the battery of
the EMS in (1).
III. PRIVACY WITH AN ARBITRARY ENERGY
CONSUMPTION
In this section, we provide bounds on the information leak-
age rate when no restrictions are imposed on the probability
law of Xn. We first propose the construction of a stable
battery policy P ∗β and characterize an upper bound on the
information leakage rate Lβ induced by P ∗β and any arbitrary
random process Xn. Furthermore, we show the tightness of
the upper bound by constructing a random process Xˆ whose
leakage is tight with respect to the upper bound. Moreover,
the leakage rate induced by the random process Xˆ is shown
to be independent of the employed battery policy Pβ ∈ Pβ .
This shows that the upper bound is tight with respect to the
minimum information leakage rate a stable battery policy Pβ
can guarantee for general random processes Xn.
The approach to policy construction in this section is
similar to the code construction in [28] where a trapdoor
channel with a box of size βˆ is considered. Therein, at every
time instant a ball numbered 1, 2, ..., αˆ is introduced into the
box and one of the βˆ + 1 inside the box is extracted. In [28,
Section II] the case in which the box acts as a jammer trying to
obstruct the communication process between a sender inserting
the balls into the box and a receiver drawing the output balls
is studied. Therein, the ball extracted from the box is selected
in order to minimize the mutual information between the
input and the output. Note that the extraction criteria is not
probabilistic and is instead analyzed using combinatorial tools.
Remarkably, in [28, Proposition 1] it is shown that the Shannon
capacity Cβˆ of such channels is lower bounded by
Cβ ≥ log αˆ
βˆ + 1
. (8)
Moreover, when αˆ = 2 the capacity is upper bounded by
Cβ ≤ 1
βˆ + 1
. (9)
In [28] the output is constrained to permutations of the
input sequence. In our setting, the sum of the output sequence
is bounded by the sum of the input sequence and the size of
the battery. However, the output is not required to contain the
same symbols as the input . For that reason, the approach in
[28] requires some modification but the main idea remains.
The derivation is presented in the next section.
A. Upper bound on the information leakage rate
We propose a battery policy based on the code construction
in [28]. The codebook proposed in the trapdoor channel context
is the counterpart of the battery policy in the smart meter case.
The proposed policy structures the energy request sequences
according to the output alphabet defined below.
Definition 4: Consider the set of codewords of length l
constructed by repetitions of 0 or α symbols, i.e. Ol =
{(0, 0, · · · , 0), (α, α, · · · , α)}. For n = lm, we define the
block repetition alphabet as the set Oml of sequences obtained
by the m-fold concatenation of codewords of length l. Specif-
ically
Oml = Ol ×Ol × ...×Ol. (10)
We now define a stable policy that maps the energy consump-
tion of the user to the output sequences constructed with the
block repetition alphabet Oml .
Definition 5: A block battery policy P ∗β is a mapping of
the form
P ∗β : S × X n → Oml ∩ Y lβ (s0,x) . (11)
Note that a block battery policy is nothing more than a strategy
to assign to each input sequence a stable energy request
sequence constructed with a block repetition alphabet. With
these definitions at hand we now provide the following privacy
guarantee.
Theorem 1: Consider an EMS with a battery of capacity
β and initial state s0 ∈ S . Let Xn be a random process with
Xi taking values in X = {0, 1, ..., α} for i = 1, 2, . . . n and
P ∗β a block battery policy as described in Definition 5. Then
for l ≤ b(β + 1)/αc at least one policy P ∗β exists such that
Lβ
(
Xn, P ∗β
) ≤ 1b(β + 1)/αc . (12)
Proof: Notice that the information leakage rate is upper
bounded by
Lβ
(
Xn, P ∗β
)
=
1
n
I (Xn;Y n) ≤ 1
n
H (Y n) . (13)
Since Y n takes values in Oml and |Oml | = 2m the following
holds:
1
n
H (Y n) ≤ 1
n
log |Oml | =
1
n
log (2m) =
m
n
=
1
l
. (14)
We now show that when l ≤ (β + 1)/α there exists at
least one block battery policy P ∗β for every initial state s0
and consumption x. To prove this we establish that for every
realization x and initial state s0 there exist an energy request
sequence determined by y ∈ Oml such that y belongs to the set
of stable energy requests Ynβ (s0,x). The strategy is to notice
that Oml ∩ Ynβ (s0,x) 6= ∅ for m = 1 and to then prove by
induction that the non-emptiness of the intersection holds for
m ≥ 1.
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Fig. 3. Upper bound on the information leakage rate of an EMS as a function
of the ratio between the battery size and the peak power consumption.
The intersection {(0, 0, · · · , 0), (α, α, · · · , α)} ∩
Y lβ
(
s0, X
l
)
is non-empty if and only if either the sequence
(0, 0, · · · , 0) or (α, α, · · · , α) belong to Ynβ (s0,x). Jointly
with (2) this implies that either
si + 0− xi ∈ S (15)
or
si + α− xi ∈ S (16)
holds for i ≤ l. In the first case, described in (15), we have
that 0− xi ≤ 0 for i = 0, · · · , l− 1. Hence, the energy stored
in the battery, si, decreases monotonically. Therefore, all si
belong to S when si ≥ 0 on the last time step, i.e.,
0 ≤ s0 −
l−1∑
i=0
xi. (17)
Similarly, in the case described by (16), we have that α−xi ≥
0 and the energy stored increases monotonically. It is then
sufficient to show that
s0 −
l−1∑
i=0
xi ≤ β − αl. (18)
When β − αl ≥ −1 every integer si satisfies at least one
of the inequalities given by (17) and (18). This ensures that
either (17) or (18) hold for every s0 ∈ S and x ∈ X l, and
therefore, the intersection Oml ∩Ynβ (s0,x) is non-empty. This
completes the proof for m = 1. The induction for m ≥ 1 is
straightforward as the proof for m = 1 holds for every initial
state s0.
The upper bound derived in Theorem 1 is depicted for
different battery sizes in Fig. 3. It is interesting to note that
the privacy guarantees increase significantly for small values of
β/α but the benefit vanishes as the size of the battery increases.
B. Tightness of the upper bound
We now study the tightness of the upper bound presented
in Theorem 1. To this end, we construct a random process
modelling the energy consumption of the user that is tight
with respect to the result in Theorem 1 for every battery policy
Pβ ∈ Pβ .
Theorem 2: Consider an EMS with a battery of capacity
β and initial state s0. Let Xˆn be a random process taking
uniformly distributed values in Oml with l = d(β + 1)/αe.
Let Pβ be a stable battery policy. Then
Lβ
(
Xˆn, Pβ
)
=
1
d(β + 1)/αe . (19)
Proof: We expand Lβ as
1
n
I (Xn;Y n) =
1
n
H (Xn)− 1
n
H (Xn|Y n) . (20)
When Xn is uniformly distributed over the alphabet Oml it
yields
1
n
H (Xn) =
1
n
m =
1
l
. (21)
We now show that the equivocation rate 1nH (X
n|Y n) is 0
when Xn takes values in Oml with l > β/α. We prove by
induction that when the input realization x belongs to Oml with
l > β/α, the sets Ynβ (s0,x) of stable output words generated
by different consumption sequences are disjoint, i.e.
Ynβ (s0, xˆ) ∩ Ynβ (s0,x) = ∅ for xˆ 6= x. (22)
As a result, any request sequence y ∈ Ynβ (s0,x) unequivo-
cally determines the generating input x. In other words, given
an output sequence y there is no uncertainty about the input
x, and therefore, the equivocation rate 1nH (X
n|Y n) is 0.
For m = 1 there are two possible inputs (0, 0, · · · , 0) and
(α, α, · · · , α). When x = (0, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ O1l the energy stored
in the battery at time l is given by
sl = s0 +
l−1∑
i=0
(yi − 0) . (23)
Similarly, when x = (α, α, · · · , α) ∈ X l the energy stored in
the battery at time l is given by
zl = s0 +
l−1∑
i=0
(yi − α) . (24)
Taking the difference between (23) and (24) yields:
sl − zl =
l−1∑
i=0
α = lα. (25)
When zl ∈ S we have that sl = zl + lα ≥ lα, showing
that for lα > β the events zl ∈ S and sl ∈ S do not
occur simultaneously. This implies that the set of output words
belonging to Ynβ (s0, (0, 0, · · · , 0)) and Ynβ (s0, (α, α, · · · , α))
is empty for every initial state s0. Therefore the sets are disjoint
and 1nH (X
n|Y n) = 0. The proof for m > 1 follows by
induction and noticing that the proof above is valid for every
initial state s0.
IV. PRIVACY WITH AN AVERAGE ENERGY CONSTRAINT
The information leakage rate bounds provided in Section
III do not impose any moment restriction on the random
process modeling the energy consumption of the user. Indeed,
they depend only on the range of the energy consumption
and on the size of the battery. However, one of the most
widely used energy consumption metrics is the average energy
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Fig. 4. Upper bound on the information leakage rate of an EMS when
n → ∞ as a function of the average energy consumption of the user for
different values of the ratio between the battery size and the peak power
consumption.
consumption over an arbitrary time interval. In fact, it is
common for SMs to display this information to the user.
In the following, we particularize the results in Theorem 1
and Theorem 2 to the case in which the average energy
consumption of the user is specified. Specifically, we analyze
the impact of the average energy consumption on the privacy
performance. We define the average energy consumption of
the random process Xn as
µn = E
[
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Xi
]
. (26)
Note that since we do not impose any stationarity condition
on the random process Xn, the average energy consumption
is a function of the time index n. This agrees with the non-
stationary nature observed in energy consumption profiles of
users [23].
A. Upper bound on the information leakage rate
The following result provides an upper bound on the in-
formation leakage rate for random processes Xn with average
energy consumption µn.
Theorem 3: Consider a battery system with capacity β and
initial state s0. Let Xn be a random process with average
energy consumption µn. Let P ∗β be a block battery policy, then
for l ≥ b(β + 1)/αc at least one policy P ∗β exists such that
Lβ
(
Xn, P ∗β
) ≤ max
(
H2
(
µn− βn
α
)
, H2
(
µn+
β
n
α
))
b(β + 1)/αc , (27)
where H2(p) = −p log2 p − (1 − p) log2(1 − p) denotes the
binary entropy.
Proof: The entropy of a random process Y n taking values
in Oml is upper bounded by
1
n
H(Y n)=
1
n
m−1∑
i=0
H
(
Yil, . . . , Y(i+1)l−1|Y0, . . . , Yil−1
)
(28)
≤ 1
n
m−1∑
i=0
H
(
Yil, . . . , Y(i+1)l−1
)
, (29)
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Fig. 5. Upper bound on the information leakage rate of an EMS when
n → ∞ as a function of the ratio between the battery size and the peak
power consumption for different values of the average energy consumption of
the user
where (28) follows by applying the chain rule and (29) follows
from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy. Notice that
(29) is the entropy of m sequences Y l taking values in Ol,
and therefore, the entropy of Y n is upper bounded by
1
n
H (Y n) ≤ 1
l
H2
E
[
1
n
∑n−1
i=0 Yi
]
α
 , (30)
for the case in which each sequence Y l is independent and
identically distributed, i.e. with distribution
P
[
Y l = (α, α, . . . , α)
]
=
E
[
1
n
∑n−1
i=0 Yi
]
α
, (31)
and
P
[
Y l = (0, 0, . . . , 0)
]
= 1− P [Y l = (α, α, . . . , α)] . (32)
We now bound the average energy requested from the grid as
a function of the average energy consumption of the user and
the battery size. Dividing (1) by n and taking the expected
value yields
E
[
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Yi
]
= E
[
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Xi
]
+ E
[
Sn − s0
n
]
, (33)
or equivalently
µn − β
n
≤ E
[
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Yi
]
≤ µn + β
n
. (34)
Notice now that for l ≤ (β + 1)/α, and for every initial state
s0 ∈ S and input realization x ∈ X n there exists a sequence
y ∈ Oml such that y belongs to the set of stable energy
requests Ynβ (s0,x). This completes the proof.
The upper bound on the information leakage rate when the
average energy consumption of the user is known and n→∞
is illustrated in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. As expected, the binary
entropy term in Theorem 3 introduces concavity in the upper
bound as shown in Fig. 4. Interestingly, Fig. 5 shows that the
information leakage rate reduction as the size of the battery
increases is less significant for extreme values of the average
energy consumption.
B. Tightness of the upper bound
Proceeding in a similar fashion as in Section III we now
prove that the upper bound in Theorem 3 is tight for a certain
class of random processes modelling the energy consumption.
Theorem 4: Consider a battery system with capacity β and
initial state s0. Let Xˆn be a random process with average
energy consumption µn and taking values in Oml with l =d(β + 1)/αe. Let Pβ be a stable battery policy, then
Lβ
(
Xˆn, Pβ
)
=
1
d(β + 1)/αeH2
(µn
α
)
. (35)
Proof: Borrowing from (30) the entropy rate of the
random process Xn taking values in Oml is upper bounded
by
1
n
H (Xn) ≤ 1
l
H2
E
[
1
n
∑n−1
i=0 Xi
]
α
 , (36)
with equality when the X l symbols forming Xn are i.i.d. We
now recall that when Xn takes values in Oml with l > β/α the
input xn can be uniquely determined from the output sequence
yn and H (Xn|Y n) = 0. We conclude the proof by selecting
l = d(β + 1)/αe.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied the information leakage rate of EMSs with
finite battery capacity for general random processes modelling
the energy consumption of the user. Inspired by the results
on permuting channels we have proposed a battery charging
policy with bounded information leakage rate for arbitrary
random processes. We have particularized the analysis to
the case in which the average energy consumption of the
user is known and we have concluded that extreme values
of the average energy consumption provide lower values of
information leakage to the utility provider.
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